Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault and the Project of a Spatial History

STUART ELDEN

CONTINUUM
Mapping the Present
A note on translations

Throughout, key works are referenced back to the original language. In some instances this is not merely desirable but essential – crucial texts of both Heidegger and Foucault are unavailable in English. Where translations do exist, they have generally been used, although they have often been modified, to ensure readability, consistency, and particularly to allow emphasis on the spatial language used.
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Abbreviations

I Abbreviations to works by Friedrich Nietzsche


Individual works are cited by the following code; references are to the part, section and sub-section by number, rather than the page, as these are the same in all editions.


WM  Der Wille zur Macht (Notes from 1883–8), in Nietzsche's Werke, Leipzig, C. G. Naumann Verlag, ten volumes, 1906, Vols 9 and 10.


II Abbreviations to works by Martin Heidegger

**GA** *Gesamtausgabe*, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975ff.

**GA1** *Frühe Schriften*, 1978.


**GA4** *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung*, 1981.


**GA10** *Der Satz vom Grund*, 1997. Translated by Reginald Lilly as *The*
Abbreviations


GA15 Seminare, 1986.


| GA55 | *Heraklit: (1) Der Anfang des abendländischen Denkens; (2) Logik: Heraklits Lehre vom Logos*, 1979. |
Abbreviations


Q  *Questions*, translated by various and including in the fourth volume the original protocols of the Thor and Zahringen seminars, Paris: Gallimard, four volumes, 1966–76.

SDU  *Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität; Das Rektorat 1933/34: Tatsachen und Gedanken*, edited by Herman Heidegger, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983.


Abbreviations


The majority of texts translated from the Gesamtausgabe have the pagination of the German version at the top of the page, allowing a single page reference. Exceptions are noted above.

III Abbreviations to works by Michel Foucault


TNP: This is Not a Pipe, translated by James Harkess, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.


Introduction

The affinities between two of the most influential European thinkers of the twentieth century – Martin Heidegger and Michel Foucault – have been left relatively unexplored. Despite the enormous amount of critical attention that has been given to them separately, there are only a small number of texts that discuss the relation between them. However in an interview given just before his death Foucault made an important comment:

Heidegger has always been for me the essential philosopher. I began by reading Hegel, then Marx, and I set out to read Heidegger in 1951 or 1952; then in 1952 or 1953 . . . I read Nietzsche . . . My entire philosophical development was determined by my reading of Heidegger. I nevertheless recognise that Nietzsche outweighed him [l’a emporté] . . . It is probable that if I had not read Heidegger, I would not have read Nietzsche. I had tried to read Nietzsche in the fifties but Nietzsche alone said nothing to me – whereas Nietzsche and Heidegger: that was a philosophical shock! (DE IV, 703; PPC 250)

Foucault’s other references to Heidegger are very brief, and hardly amount to anything. Yet he suggests that his entire philosophical development was determined by Heidegger, and that reading him was central to his understanding of Nietzsche. The reason why Foucault hardly ever mentions Heidegger is, he suggests, that one ‘should have a small number of authors with whom one thinks, with whom one works, but about whom one does not write’ (DE IV, 703; PPC 250).

It is perhaps understandable that Foucault’s lack of reference to Heidegger should be paralleled in the secondary literature, but a detailed reading of both authors shows how deep the influence runs. When Foucault’s influences are examined the standard procedure is to make reference to his rejection of parts of Marxism, debate the charge of structuralism, and to acknowledge the debt to Nietzsche – especially on the points of the historical approach and the understanding of power. Sometimes a passing gesture is made to the influence
of Bachelard and Canguilhem. My contention in this book is that it is very difficult to properly understand Foucault’s work – or, at least, major parts of it – without understanding the influence of Heidegger. Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow – in a book endorsed by Foucault – trace the influence of Heidegger on the early Foucault, but see a distance between them in Foucault’s later work; other commentators make remarks such as these:

Nietzsche, not Heidegger, defines the horizon from which Foucault most often takes his departure. Heidegger’s influence is apparent throughout Foucault’s writing, but it is found in a more Nietzschean context.

Heidegger’s influence on Foucault is immense and crucial to an understanding of his work, but the Heideggerian influence on Foucault is mediated by Foucault’s understanding of Nietzsche.

This book makes the claim that the reverse of this is actually the case – that Nietzsche’s influence on Foucault is indeed immense, but it is continually mediated by Heidegger, and Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche. This is, of course, closer to what Foucault – in the remarks above – actually said.

Foucault read Heidegger in the original German, and we can therefore be sure that in the early 1950s he had access to a range of Heidegger’s most important texts – *Being and Time*, the *Letter on Humanism*, *Holzwege*, *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung*, *Vorträge und Aufsätze* – and though the Nietzsche volumes were not published until 1961, important essays that anticipated their contents were found in earlier collections. A number of parallels between Heidegger and Foucault immediately present themselves – most of which will not be treated in detail here. As Miller has noted, Heidegger’s *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* implicitly informs Foucault’s second thesis on Kant’s *Anthropology*; *The Order of Things* relies on Heidegger’s critique of humanism; and *The Archaeology of Knowledge* looks at the anonymous domain where ‘one’ – Heidegger’s *das Man* – speaks. Similarly, Derrida notes the association between the analysis of death in *The Birth of the Clinic* and in Heidegger’s work. It would also be interesting to see how important Heidegger’s understanding of care [*Sorge*] and concern [*besorgen*] is for Foucault’s later work on the care/concern [*souci*] of the self, to examine the related understanding of freedom, and to see how Heidegger’s reading of Greek thought relates to Foucault’s readings of antiquity.

However, this book is concerned with the relation between these two thinkers on the question of their historical and spatial approaches, and indeed with the general question of the relation between space and history. Questions of spatiality have often been thought to be the preserve of geographers and
urbanists, and there have recently been a number of attempts in these fields to critically theorize space.\textsuperscript{12} There are, for me, two principal problems with these attempts. One of these is that any theorist who talks of space is unproblematically appropriated as ‘one of them’, which conflates the work of thinkers whose understandings of space or place are quite different.\textsuperscript{13} The specific philosophical, historical, political and geographical situation of the works used is often ignored. However practically valuable, useful and interesting these recent studies may have been, they are often worryingly conceptually weak.

Second, although there has undoubtedly been a heavy bias in favour of history and time in the past, to swing too far the other way through a privileging of geography and space is no solution. Yet much of this recent work does precisely that.\textsuperscript{14} Instead, we need to think of the two together: we need to both historicize space and spatialize history. In other words, rather than solely providing an analysis of how the meaning and use of the word ‘space’ has changed over time – a useful analysis to be sure – we need to recognize how space, place and location are crucial determining factors in any historical study. This is the project of a spatial history.

Michel Foucault has been one of the major thinkers whose work has been seized upon by those who want to argue for the importance of space, and yet relatively little is known about his own use of space in his works. This is due to a number of reasons. First, Foucault wrote only a small number of pieces that directly addressed the question of space, and these have been the principal focus of analysis in the works cited above. Other than the incessant emphasis on the Panopticon, the most oft-cited work of Foucault’s on space is a lecture given to architects in 1967, but only published just before his death. This lecture is entitled ‘Of Other Spaces’, and introduces the notion of heterotopias. This work is of undoubted interest, but it offers a history of the concept of space and then proceeds to discuss and analyse many spaces of our modern world. It is important to note that this piece is the exception rather than the rule. The norm for Foucault is to use space not merely as another area to be analysed, but as a central part of the approach itself. From the madhouses of \textit{Histoire de la folie}, the hospitals of \textit{The Birth of the Clinic} and the Rio lectures on the history of medicine, to the plague town, army camp and prisons of \textit{Discipline and Punish}, Foucault always seemed to take into account the spatial elements of the historical question he was addressing. Second, these historical works – spatial through and through – have been incompletely understood, at least in the English speaking world. This is at least partly due to the fact that a complete translation of \textit{Histoire de la folie} and much of the important material Foucault produced in the early 1970s relating to the project of discipline have never appeared in English. Third, and perhaps most important, Foucault’s intellectual heritage has been treated only partially.
When Foucault’s historical approach is examined Nietzsche is usually regarded as the principal influence. Nietzsche’s understanding of power, the notion of genealogy, and the continued emphasis on Nietzsche in Foucault’s works immediately highlight an important relation, but my suggestion is that Nietzsche is continually mediated through Heidegger, and particularly Heidegger’s book *Nietzsche*. The general point being made is that, although Nietzsche’s influence on Foucault is of great importance, there are a number of central issues in Foucault’s work that cannot be explained solely with reference to Nietzsche and Foucault’s appropriation of his ideas. Here I argue that several key points – the orientation of history toward the present, the relation between power and knowledge, the issues of technology and the *dispositif* – are prefigured by some of Heidegger’s arguments. I suggest that genealogy is historical ontology, a term Foucault himself uses in late works, but which is indebted to the Heidegger of the 1930s and beyond. Most importantly, the aim of this book is to provide a theoretical approach towards a spatial history. I suggest that this is indeed what Foucault does, and that his understanding of space, and his use of a spatialized history, is indebted not so much to his reading of Nietzsche but, most importantly, to his reading of Heidegger.

But Heidegger is not simply of interest in order to show how his work informed and shaped that of Foucault. If Foucault has been badly served by cultural critics eager to get their hands on his theoretical ‘toolkit’, Heidegger’s work on space and place has suffered through simplistic, partial, politically blind, ideologically loaded, or philosophically insubstantial readings. As Heidegger was only too aware, his work was perhaps best characterized as a ‘path’ [*Weg*], and on the key issues of space and history his work certainly went through a number of changes. First, then, I take three chapters to focus on the work of Heidegger. The first chapter looks at the process that led to the publication of *Being and Time* and examines the working out in lecture courses of parts of unpublished divisions. This chapter ends at the beginning of the 1930s – a crucial time for Heidegger both philosophically and politically. Chapter Two picks up the story at this point, outlining the philosophical points at stake in the Rectorship and its aftermath, concentrating on the key readings of Nietzsche and Hölderlin – two central figures in Heidegger’s own development and important in terms of the argument here concerning his influence on Foucault. Concerning the putative *Kehre* (turn), I suggest that the privilege accorded to time in *Being and Time* is corrected in Heidegger’s later works, and that the ontology of *Dasein* is historicized to become a historical ontology. These changes may well have been apparent much earlier if Heidegger had published Division III of Part One and Part Two of *Being and Time*. On the issue of space, it is clear from *Being and Time* that Heidegger wants to rethink it as the resolutely non-Cartesian *place*. The use of *Platz* and *Ort* – both words
translated here as ‘place’ – is important in understanding this issue. In some of his later works Heidegger suggests that ‘space’ can be thought more originally from this understanding of ‘place’. Chapter Three then looks at a number of issues in Heidegger’s work – art, technology, poetic dwelling and the πόλις – which showcase the application of the theoretical insights into space, place and history traced in the preceding two chapters.

Due emphasis is accorded to the political element in Heidegger’s philosophy. Rather than separate the man from the thought or merely dismiss him as a thinker, moves that have tended to dog discussions of Heidegger’s Nazism, I follow a number of recent studies in examining the importance of the political to his thought. The relationship of the political and the spatial is examined in detail, particularly through the discussion of Heidegger’s rethinking of the πόλις. Such a reading allows us new perspective on Heidegger’s retreat from his Nazi allegiance. Though it is possible to provide a picture of Heidegger’s path through the works he published in his lifetime – to which Foucault would have had access – this path becomes much clearer and more involved if the lecture courses published in the Gesamtausgabe since 1975 are taken into account. These lecture courses shed particular light on Heidegger’s readings of Kant, Aristotle and Hölderlin. The first three chapters of this book therefore treat Heidegger in detail, from Being and Time, through the crucially important reading of Nietzsche and Hölderlin in the shadow of Nazism, to the later work on art, technology, politics and place. As well as showing the role Heidegger’s thought plays in influencing Foucault, the exposition of Heidegger’s work also makes a number of claims about his own development.

The second half of the book begins by examining Foucault’s historical approach, which falls, on his own designation, into archaeological and genealogical phases. Explicitly in the second, but implicitly in the first, his work was framed by a reading of Nietzsche. This has led many critics to examine the Nietzsche/Foucault relation at length. Such an examination is useful in a number of ways, but most importantly it shows that Nietzsche alone could not have provided Foucault with the necessary conceptual apparatus to shape his approach. Because the influence of Nietzsche cannot explain the importance of space to Foucault, a number of issues arise that raise problems about the standard interpretation of Foucault. Why is Discipline and Punish framed as a history of the present? Is there a link between Foucault’s understanding of the distinction between connaissance and savoir and the later notion of historical ontology? What is the theoretical base of his discussions of technology and the dispositif? Why, too, are his historical studies so overtly spatialized?

On the basis of the earlier detailed discussion of Heidegger, I am able to discuss Foucault’s work on history and space from a much stronger perspective. Showing the influence of Heidegger in these areas situates Foucault’s
work in a much broader intellectual context than is usually recognized. This is not simply a case of asking ‘where did he get that from?’ which, as Heidegger suggests, stems ‘from a shopkeeper’s mentality’ (GA26, 54). Rather, concepts of Foucault’s such as the connaissance/savoir distinction, ontology, dispositif, technologies, the history of the present, space, knowledge and power become much clearer – and therefore more useful – if viewed through a Heideggerian lens. In this reading, the notion of genealogy is recast as a historical ontology, which is framed as a critique of the present. In Foucault’s work, this Heideggerian notion is described as a history of the present. Here, with the emphasis on the importance of space, it is re-described as a mapping of the present. Such a mapping of the present is a spatial history, rather than a history of space.

With this enriched understanding of Foucault’s intellectual heritage we are in a better position to understand his historical studies, because as well as being more attentive to their theoretical foundations, we can better see the role of space within them. To demonstrate this, the final chapter re-reads two of Foucault’s most celebrated historical studies – the history of madness, and the history of the disciplined society – as spatial histories. The first of these histories is known to the English reader as Madness and Civilisation, which is a greatly edited version of the French original Histoire de la folie. As Colin Gordon has pointed out, a number of problems arise from this editing. Re-reading Histoire de la folie shows the range of the early Foucault’s concerns, and allows us insight into how space has been used politically in relation to the mad, showing the exclusion, ordering, moralization and confinement that were brought to bear on their situation. The second history is Discipline and Punish, the central text in a much wider project that encompasses The Birth of the Clinic and a number of shorter pieces, lectures and courses at the Collège de France. Re-reading Discipline and Punish within this wider project allows us to see that the model for the disciplinary society is not punishment, as is usually thought, but the interrelation of a number of mechanisms, notably those of the army and medicine. Such a reading enables us to shift the emphasis of spatial analysis away from the Panopticon, and to recognize the importance of space in a number of other areas.

In re-reading these histories from the perspective of the spatial question, I am able to demonstrate the theoretical insights of the previous chapters in a practical setting. Equally re-reading these two major projects as spatial histories allows their standard interpretations to be re-placed, in the light of the argument developed in the previous chapters. In both histories we see the relation between conceptualizations of space and their practical applications; how space and time work together within a historical study; the way understandings of space have changed over time; and how space is fundamental to any exercise of power. Space is inherently political; politics is inherently spatial. In addition,
through this practical demonstration, the final chapter provides a reinterpretation of two justly famous and much-referenced texts.

The assertion of space within social theory must not be at the expense of the importance of time and history. In addition, the theorization of space must be philosophically substantial, politically informed, and critically aware. Whilst we can profitably learn from a history of the concept of space, just as we can from a history of the concept of time,\textsuperscript{17} simply to undertake this history is, paradoxically, and contrary to the avowed intent of geographers, to continue the modernist occlusion of space. Space simply becomes another term to be examined historically. Rather, we need to spatialize history, to inject an awareness of space into all historical studies, to critically examine the power relations at play in the ways space is effected and effects. Understanding the way Heidegger shaped Foucault’s historical approach shows this notion of a spatial history to be immanent to Foucault’s major works. Foucault’s work can therefore be thought of – and potentially employed – as mapping the present.
CHAPTER I

Space and History in Being and Time

What we know of the early Heidegger has changed dramatically since the mid-1970s. Until relatively recently Being and Time, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics and odd lectures were the only texts available from the 1920s. The incompleteness of Being and Time – only two of a projected six divisions were published – and the fact that it appeared after more than a decade of silence on Heidegger’s part, has always caused difficulties in understanding its importance and situating its insights. With the publication of Heidegger’s lecture courses in the Gesamtausgabe and the coming to light of some other pieces several issues become much clearer. At the same time a number of complications arise: some because they require the rethinking of Heidegger’s thought; some because of the problematic nature of this edition itself.¹ The lecture courses develop material originally scheduled for the unpublished divisions, situate Heidegger in relation to the tradition of phenomenology in greater detail, and provide closer analysis of key figures in his development, notably Kant and Aristotle. Most of the material covered in this chapter was produced while Heidegger was lecturing at the University of Marburg, the significance of which will be remarked upon below. Recently the wider context of the genesis of Being and Time has been discussed in great detail in Kisiel’s pathbreaking work,² and this study is indebted to it. However, regarding the issues of space and history, some elucidation is still required.

ONTOLOGY, HISTORY AND TIME

Husserlian phenomenology was basically ahistorical,³ perhaps because of Husserl’s background in mathematics and logic. For Heidegger however, as Krell has argued, the history of philosophy was an ‘essential counterweight to phenomenology’: whereas Husserl had once remarked that he had ‘forgotten about history’, Heidegger never did.⁴ In Being and Time Heidegger makes some comments indicating the importance of the historical project, though, as shall be seen, his later work suggests that here he did not go far enough. The
basic issues at stake can be seen if the distinction Heidegger makes between ontic and ontological knowledge is examined. Ontic knowledge is knowledge pertaining to the distinctive nature of beings as such, it is the knowledge of the sciences, whereas ontological knowledge is the basis on which any such theory (of ontic knowledge) could be constructed, the a priori conditions for the possibility of such sciences. Heidegger’s own exercise of fundamental ontology deals with the conditions of possibility not just of the ontic sciences, but also of the ontologies that precede and found them. This is the question of being (GA2, 11; see GA26, 195–202).5

A glimpse of the possibility this insight allows is found in Heidegger’s discussion of Newton:

To say that before Newton his laws were neither true nor false, cannot signify that before him there were no such beings as have been uncovered and pointed out by those laws. Through Newton the laws became true; and with them, beings became accessible in themselves to Dasein. Once beings have been uncovered, they show themselves precisely as beings which beforehand already were. Such uncovering is the kind of being which belongs to ‘truth’.

That there are ‘eternal truths’ will not be adequately proved until someone has succeeded in demonstrating that Dasein has been and will be for all eternity. As long as such a proof is still outstanding, this principle remains a fanciful contention which does not gain in legitimacy from having philosophers commonly ‘believe’ it. Because the kind of being that is essential to truth is of the character of Dasein, all truth is relative to Dasein’s being (GA2, 227).6

From this, it is clear that Dasein and truth are fundamentally linked, that truth is context dependent. This does not mean that truth is only what an individual thinks, but that truth only has a context dependent on the existence of Dasein (GA3, 281–2). Any eternal truths must rest on an eternal immutability to Dasein. It clearly follows from this that if being changes, or is historicized, so too is truth. It has been remarked by some critics that Heidegger does indeed, in *Being and Time*, suggest such an immutability to Dasein, examining it and its structures as if they were true eternally. Such critics sometimes point to a shift in the later Heidegger towards an understanding of historical nature of being, through a historical sense of Dasein, which would, following the quotation and explication here, lead to a historicizing of truth.7 The ontic/ontological difference – especially when historicized – is one that Foucault would go on to elaborate and use in the distinction between connaissance and savoir in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, where he examined what he called the ‘historical a priori’.8
The idea of the history of being does not appear as an explicit theme until later works, although it would appear that the second part of *Being and Time* would have covered some of this area. However, Heidegger does offer some thoughts on history in what was published of *Being and Time*. These theses are developed in the second division of the work, and are designed for an examination of the historical nature of existence. Lest there be confusion between what Heidegger does in *Being and Time*, and what I will argue he does later, the following point should be considered. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger attempts to understand the structures of Dasein, among which is the sense of history. In his later works, Heidegger historicizes these very structures; in the specific case effectively historicizing the sense of history. If in *Being and Time* Heidegger attempts an ontology of history (for which the ground must be Dasein rather than historiography), in his later work he attempts a history of ontology. This radical shift is central to the influence he was to have on Foucault.

The model of history that Heidegger uses is that of Nietzsche in the second *Untimely Meditation*, ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of Historiography for Life’. This is the only passage of *Being and Time* that treats Nietzsche at any length, a point that shall be returned to. It is worth rehearsing the arguments of Nietzsche here, for Heidegger’s reading departs in some important ways. For Nietzsche, history is not capable of objectivity, and where this is aimed for often great harm results. Instead, history has to be subjective, and therefore historians need to be aware of the uses to which their work is being put. In the preface to this work, Nietzsche provides a succinct summary of how he sees the use of historical study:

> For I do not know what meaning classical philology would have for our time if not to have an untimely effect within it, that is, to act against the time and so have an effect on the time, to the advantage, it is to be hoped, of a coming time. (UB II, Preface)

In other words, Nietzsche is aware that studying the past allows us to effect the present, and through this, the future. This much was clear from his *The Birth of Tragedy*, written immediately before this work. Nietzsche sees that there is something fundamentally wrong with the present, that there may be things in the past that may be of interest and illumination, and that knowing these things may be useful to change both how we see the present, and the future. Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the cultural malaise of his own time – exacerbated by the threat of war and the Paris Commune – can be cured by seeing how Greece dealt with a parallel problem. Wagner’s music dramas can, once reinterpreted in a particular way, provide future benefit.
The *Untimely Meditation* suggests that history is a necessary part of human lives. Unlike the animal, which forgets and is therefore able to live unhistorically, what distinguishes humans is that they remember. Humans live with a sense of time, they remain attached to the past as if chained. The fleeting moment, although it flashes by, can return as a ‘spectre’ to haunt a later moment. The human therefore has a need of history, but we need to be careful to ensure that it is used to the best advantage of life. This involves a number of balances. First, we must learn that if we remember everything we would never act. Some degree of unhistorical living is necessary (UB II, 1). Nietzsche then distinguishes between three types of history – the monumental, the antiquarian and the critical. As far as humans are active and striving, they have need of monumental history; where they preserve and admire, antiquarian; and where they suffer and are in need of liberation, critical (UB II, 2).

Monumental history is the kind of history needed by someone who aspires to greatness. Nietzsche suggests that by looking back into the past one can see what might be possible again in the future, because what was once possible can be possible again. The question arises as to what difference there is between a monumental past and a mythical fiction. In order to serve its ends, the monumental approach has to generalize and be selective. A dominance of this mode of history would be dangerous because of the fear that some things might be forgotten, and because this mode deceives by analogies, as things will not be the same again (UB II, 2). Antiquarian history is for use by those who preserve and revere – who give thanks for their existence by acknowledging their debt to the past. However, like monumental history, antiquarian history has its problems. It has a tendency to inflate the past, runs the risk of nostalgia and is possibly not entirely critical. Without some critical perspective there is the danger that all is equally revered – without selection – and that the new is despised in relation to the past. Nietzsche suggests that this could mean that life is no longer preserved but is mummified (UB II, 3). The antiquarian and the monumental thus both complement and contradict each other: one takes the spirit from the past in order to elevate the future whereas the other praises heritage.

To accompany these modes of history Nietzsche thinks that the human ‘must have the strength, and use it from time to time, to shatter and dissolve something to enable them to live’. As he would repeatedly stress in his later work, he who wishes to create must first destroy. This is the critical attitude to the past (UB II, 3). It is clear from this early essay that Nietzsche sees each of the three modes of history as having its particular context. He suggests that much harm is caused by thoughtless transplanting of the modes. Out of their native soil they will grow as weeds (UB II, 2). At the start of the essay Nietzsche had quoted from Goethe: ‘Moreover I hate anything which merely
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instructs me without increasing or directly enlivening [beleben] my activity’ (UB II, Preface). Nietzsche uses this quotation to suggest that we need history, but for life [Leben] and action, in order to serve life, rather than for narrow, scholarly, scientific goals. Given the choice of life ruling over knowledge, over science, or knowledge ruling over life, we should choose life, for any knowledge that destroys life would also have destroyed itself: knowledge presupposes life (UB II, 4).

Heidegger suggests that although Nietzsche ‘distinguished three kinds of historiography – the monumental, the antiquarian, and the critical’, he failed to explicitly point out ‘the necessity of this triad or the ground of its unity’ (GA2, 396). In fact, although his later genealogical approach is arguably a fusion of these three types of historiography, Nietzsche never explicitly states that the three should be conflated. Given Heidegger’s purpose, this joining together is of key importance. ‘The threefold character of historiography [Historie] is adumbrated in the historicality [Geschichtlichkeit] of Dasein . . . [which] enables us to understand to what extent these three possibilities must be united factically and concretely in any historiography which is authentic [eigentliche]’ (GA2, 396). It is important to note the distinction Heidegger draws between Historie and Geschichte. Historie is, for Heidegger, the writing of history, the discipline of historiography; Geschichte is history as it actually happens [geschieht], the events.

Heidegger reads these three types of historiography as having distinct attitudes to time. The antiquarian approach orientates itself to the past, the having been; the monumental to the future; and the critical to the present. It is in the reading of the last of these that Heidegger departs from Nietzsche, for Nietzsche used the critical approach as an orientation to the past. As far back as 1922 Heidegger had suggested this: ‘The critique of history is always only the critique of the present [Kritik der Gegenwart]’ (PIA 4). As Bambach notes, this may be due to Heidegger’s reading Kierkegaard’s Two Ages in the German translation Kritik der Gegenwart. We find this critical attitude exemplified in Heidegger’s reading of philosophy:

_Ruthlessness toward the tradition is reverence toward the past_, and it is genuine only in an appropriation of the latter (the past) out of a de-struction of the former (the tradition). On this basis, all actual historiographical work, something quite different from historiography in the usual sense, must dovetail with philosophy’s research into the matters themselves. (GA19, 414)

In other words, the ‘tradition’ as received in the present covers over the past. This notion of de-struction is therefore far from negative: it is an uncovering,
a de-structuring, an archaeology of the levels of interpretation, the layers of sedimentation of the tradition that have obscured the issues at stake, the matters themselves. This ties back into the project of the first two divisions of *Being and Time*:

Dasein temporalises itself in the way the future and having been are united in the present . . . As authentic, the historiography which is both monumental and antiquarian is necessarily a critique of the ‘present’. Authentic historicality is the foundation for the possibility of uniting these three ways of historiography. (GA2, 397)

These three temporal dimensions come together, as will be examined later, in the reading of the Nietzschean moment [Augenblick].

Given this, it is surprising that in *Being and Time* Heidegger neither mentions Nietzsche in his discussion of the moment, nor makes the linkage clearer. The notion here is not developed in great detail, and, at least on the surface, seems to owe more to Kierkegaard. The moment is linked to the existential situation [Situation] which Heidegger defines thus:

The existential attributes of any possible resolute Dasein include the items constitutive for an existential phenomenon which we call a *situation* . . . [in which] there is an overtone of a signification that is spatial. (GA2, 299)

Heidegger uses the German *Situation* to mean a temporal/spatial ‘there’, and opposes it to the solely spatial *Lage* [position] (see PIA 10). Each situation is a *place* in time and space, where existentially Dasein has acted authentically:

When resolute, Dasein has brought itself back from falling, and has done so precisely in order to be more authentically ‘there’ in the ‘moment of vision’ [Augenblick] as regards the situation which has been disclosed. (GA2, 328)

Regardless of the existential baggage that was later marginalized in his work, these two concepts provide an initial glimpse of what Heidegger, and certainly Foucault, went on to do: the putting into practice of the understanding of the dimensions of time and space concurrently.

One of the intended divisions of *Being and Time* was to be a critique of the Aristotelian notion of time (GA2, 40). Although it never appeared, there are occasional hints of what it may have included, and indeed *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* discusses some of this area. The Aristotelian view of time was ‘as a succession, as a “flowing stream” of “nows”, as “the course of time”’ (GA2, 421–2). Instead of this temporal sequence, of the now-no-longer,
now, and the not-yet-now (GA24, 348–9), we must, following Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche on history, see the dimensions of past, present and future together, in terms of the authentic ‘moment’ (see GA29/30, 226). It is notable that although Heidegger praises Kierkegaard’s concept of the moment, his main complaint is that it is equated with the now in the common sense (GA2, 338niii; GA24, 408). Heidegger’s development of this idea is far too inchoate in what was published of Being and Time, and even in the later The Basic Problems of Phenomenology and The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics, but again there are several hints of where it may lead. It will be suggested that it is in Heidegger’s extended reading of Nietzsche in the later 1930s and beyond that these ideas come to greater fruition, and that this formulation becomes clearer:

When historicality is authentic, it understands history as the ‘return’ [Wiederkehr] of the possible, and knows that a possibility will recur only if existence is open for it fatefully, in a moment, in resolute repetition. (GA2, 391–2)

Understanding Heidegger’s use of the three types of historiography helps to explain his comments earlier in Being and Time. At one point he writes

thus ‘the past’ has a remarkable double meaning; the past belongs irretrievably to an earlier time; it belonged to the events of that time; and in spite of that, it can still be present-at-hand ‘now’ – for instance, the remains of a Greek temple. With the temple, a ‘bit of the past’ is still ‘in the present’. (GA2, 378)

For the historical structure of Dasein, it is therefore clear that the past is ‘present’ in the present, a claim Foucault would make many times in his writings. For our current purpose it is worth bearing in mind that Heidegger tends to assimilate the meanings of two German words for presence, which mean the presence of someone in a place or at an occasion [Anwesenheit], and presence in the temporal sense [Gegenwart]. ‘For what the Greeks mean by being is being as presence, being in the present [Anwesendsein, Gegenwartsein]’ (GA19, 34; see 466–7; GA24, 305ff). Heidegger makes this idea of presence clearer in the following passage, which highlights a point Foucault would later elaborate in his reading of Nietzsche:

What we next have in mind with the term ‘history’ is not so much ‘the past’ in the sense of that which is past, but rather descent [Herkunft] from such a past. Anything that ‘has a history’ stands in the context of a becoming. In
such becoming, ‘development’ is sometimes a rise, sometimes a fall . . . Here ‘history’ signifies a ‘context’ of events and ‘effects’, which draws on through ‘the past’, the ‘present’, and the ‘future’. On this view, the past has no special priority. (GA2, 378–9)

Although Heidegger’s remarks in Being and Time are generally limited to the historicality of Dasein, at times he does hint at the direction of his thought to come. Dreyfus has suggested that the sketchy and hurried nature of Division Two should be attributed to the rush in which it was appended to the more polished first division: this may explain its partial nature.26 Heidegger suggests that

what is primarily historical is Dasein. That which is secondarily historical, however, is what we encounter within-the-world . . . also the environing nature as the ‘very soil of history’. (GA2, 381)

Usually the comments on the more general nature of history are those that directly relate the history of things to their use in reading the history of Dasein, such as the following example: ‘Remains, monuments, and records that are still present-at-hand, are possible ‘material’ for the concrete disclosure of the Dasein which has-been-there’ (GA2, 394). At one point Heidegger remarks:

equipment and work – for instance, books – have their ‘fates’ [Schicksale]; buildings and institutions have their history. And even nature is historical. It is not historical, to be sure, in so far as we speak of ‘natural history’; but nature is historical as a countryside, as an area that has been colonised or exploited, as a battlefield, or as the site of a cult [Kultstätte]. (GA2, 388)

In some ways then, rather than being the soil of history, nature might be tentatively designated as the site of history, a claim that will be discussed in Chapters Two and Three.

THE SPACE OF DASEIN AND EQUIPMENT

It is not difficult to immediately find clues that would appear to show the spatiality of Heidegger’s thought. Right from his earliest works, he uses the German word Dasein, which, as a noun, means ‘existence’, but that also, as a verb, means ‘to be there’. If this word is broken apart, or is, as Heidegger often does, hyphenated to Da-sein, it literally means ‘there-being’, ‘being-there’. It has regularly been translated as the latter of these in English, and in French