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In a new edition of his path-breaking analysis of political and social change in China since the crackdown in Tiananmen Square in 1989, Joseph Fewsmith traces developments since 2001. These include the continuing reforms during the final years of Jiang Zemin’s premiership and Hu Jintao’s succession in 2002. Here the author also considers social trends and how Chinese citizens are starting to have a significant influence on government policies. As Fewsmith – a highly regarded political scientist and a seasoned China-watcher – observes, China is a very different place today than it was eighteen years ago. In the interim, it has emerged from isolation to become one of the most significant players on the world stage. This book — more than any other — explains the forces that have shaped China since Tiananmen.

Joseph Fewsmith is Professor in the Departments of International Relations and Political Science at Boston University.
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Edited by William Kirby, Harvard University

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List of other books in the series continues after the index.
CHINA SINCE TIANANMEN

From Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao

JOSEPH FEWSMITH

Boston University
For Stephanie and Andrew
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Acknowledgments

This book has its origins in an earlier attempt to come to grips with the political trends in China since the tragic crackdown on student demonstrations on June 4, 1989, an event usually referred to simply as “Tiananmen” after the central square in Beijing that had been the focus of student activities for the preceding six weeks (though most of the violence took place outside the square). Roderick MacFarquhar asked me to analyze events in the first three years since that time for a revised edition of his *The Politics of China*, which appeared in 1997. I thank him for his encouragement to write that chapter and for his later suggestion to expand that chapter into a book—though doing so took longer and involved more than I had anticipated at the time. His intellectual support and friendship have been critical to that enterprise.

A grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation and a sabbatical leave from Boston University in 1997–8 gave me time to pursue this research. Alas, it became apparent in that year that understanding politics in the years since Tiananmen required delving into the new intellectual moods that grew up in the 1990s and reflected a very different China from the one I had grown accustomed to in the 1980s—and that required additional time and effort. Fortunately, I knew or came to know many of the intellectuals whose works are discussed in the pages that follow. They have helped me understand not only the different ideas that gained currency but also why those ideas came into being and evolved as they have. I hope that I have repaid their time and guidance by conveying the trends of the 1990s accurately.

Since the first edition of this work was published in 2001, much has happened in China. Jiang Zemin has left office and been replaced by Hu Jintao, and the tenor of public discourse has changed significantly. It seemed time to incorporate these changes by updating this work. Accordingly, an eighth chapter has been added and the earlier chapters edited down so that, hopefully, the political history of China in the eighteen years since Tiananmen can be presented coherently. An epilogue has been added discussing
Acknowledgments

the Seventeenth Party Congress in October 2007. In updating this work I was helped by my stay at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars in the fall of 2005. I am very grateful to Robert Hathaway and the staff of the center for providing such a hospitable place to study and write.

In trying to understand post-Tiananmen China, I have often worked closely with Stanley Rosen, whose translations of debates in this period are cited frequently in the text. I thank him for his insights and support. I have also benefited from the friendship and support of my colleague Merle Goldman, who read the manuscript in draft form and whose comments have improved the final form. Similarly Cheng Li and Timothy Cheek read the manuscript and provided valuable comments, as did an anonymous reviewer. William C. Kirby supported the project and provided encouragement along the way.

As anyone who has worked on such a book knows, scholarship depends on those who collect, organize, and know the material they put on the shelves of libraries. I have been fortunate to work with the best. Nancy Hearst of the Fairbank Center at Harvard University has provided critical support, not only bibliographically but also by proofreading the final manuscript. James Cheng and his staff at the Harvard-Yenching Library at Harvard have been similarly helpful. Jean Hung and the staff at the Universities Service Center at the Chinese University of Hong Kong were of great assistance in locating much material used in this study, and Annie Chang at the Center for Chinese Studies Library at the University of California at Berkeley has also been of great help in finding material. I also appreciate the help that Jennifer Sova and Luke Wilcox provided in running down sources and checking footnotes.

Parts of this volume are adapted from articles previously published by the National Bureau of Asian Research, the Asia Society, and Current History. Permission to do so is gratefully acknowledged.

Mary Child, the editor for Asian Studies, Sociology, and History of Science at Cambridge University Press, provided invaluable guidance and support in the preparation of the first edition of this work, and Marigold Acland has similarly supported the preparation of the second edition.

My wife Irene has been unfailing in her support. Our children, Stephanie and Andrew, have tolerated with uncommon grace my frequent trips to China and the time I have spent locked away in my study. Because of their patience, and just because they are such great kids, this book is dedicated to them.
Chronology

1989
June 4
Tiananmen crackdown
June 23–24
Fourth Plenary Session of the Thirteenth Central Committee
November 6–9
Fifth Plenary Session of the Thirteenth Central Committee

1990
January 10
Premier Li Peng announces the lifting of martial law in Beijing
September
Economic Work Conference
November
Yearnings broadcast
December
National Planning Conference

1991
March 22
First Huangfu Ping commentary
March
NPC promotes Zhu Rongji to vice premier
July 1
Jiang Zemin calls for opposing “peaceful evolution”
August 19–21
Attempted coup d’état in Soviet Union

1992
January 18–February 21
Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour”
March 10–12
Politburo Meeting supports Deng Xiaoping
September 28
Conservative theoretician Hu Qiaomu dies at age 81
October 12–18
Fourteenth Party Congress
October 19
First Plenary Session of the Fourteenth Central Committee

1993
March 5–7
Second Plenary Session of the Fifteenth Central Committee
xii

**Chronology**

Summer

Huntington’s article, “Clash of Civilizations?” published

August 3

Chinese ship, *Yin He*, stopped by US Navy

September 23

2000 Olympics awarded to Sydney, Australia, instead of Beijing

November

*Strategy and Management* starts publication

November 11–14

Third Plenary Session of the Fourteenth Central Committee

1994

March

*Looking at China through a Third Eye* published

September 25–28

Fourth Plenary Session of the Fourteenth Central Committee

1995

April 10

Chen Yun, advocate of a planned economy, dies at age 90

April 27

Chen Xitong removed as Beijing Party secretary

September 25–28

Fifth Plenary Session of the Fourteenth Central Committee

1996

March 8

China tests surface-to-surface missiles into sea off the coast of Taiwan

May

*China Can Say No* published

October

*Heart-to-Heart Talks with the General Secretary* published

October 7–10

Sixth Plenary Session of the Fourteenth Central Committee

1997

February 2

Former Minister of Defense Qin Jiwei dies at age 82

February 19

Deng Xiaoping dies at age 92

May 29

Jiang Zemin speaks at Central Party School

July 1

Hong Kong is returned to China

September 12–18

Fifteenth Party Congress convenes in Beijing

September 19

First Plenary Session of the Fifteenth Central Committee

October 28

Jiang Zemin arrives in Washington, D.C.
### Chronology

#### 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 25–26</td>
<td>Second Plenary Session of Fifteenth Central Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td><em>Crossed Swords</em> published</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 5–19</td>
<td>NPC meeting announces major government restructuring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 4</td>
<td>Beijing University celebrates its 100th anniversary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 27</td>
<td>President Clinton arrives in Beijing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 22</td>
<td>Jiang Zemin calls on Chinese military to withdraw from business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 14</td>
<td>Former president Yang Shangkun dies at age 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 12–14</td>
<td>Third Plenary Session of the Fifteenth Central Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 21</td>
<td>Democratic activists Wang Youcai and Xu Wenli sentenced to jail</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 23</td>
<td>United States starts bombing Serbian forces in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 6</td>
<td>Premier Zhu Rongji arrives in Washington to discuss WTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 20</td>
<td>Task force established to investigate corruption in Xiamen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 25</td>
<td>Adherents of Falun Gong demonstrate around Zhongnanhai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 7</td>
<td>US bombs hit Chinese Embassy in Belgrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 9</td>
<td>Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui describes relations with PRC as &quot;special-state-to-state&quot; relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 19–22</td>
<td>Fourth Plenary Session of Fifteenth Central Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1</td>
<td>50th anniversary of the founding of the PRC celebrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 15</td>
<td>United States and China reach agreement on China’s accession to WTO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 20</td>
<td><em>Wall Street Journal</em> reports Lin Youfang, wife of Politburo member Jia Qinglin, detained for questioning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chronology

February
Jiang Zemin raises “three represents” slogan

March 29
Enlightenment Daily carries letter implicitly criticizing Liu Junning

October 9–11
Fifth Plenary Session of Fifteenth Central Committee

2001
April 1
Chinese F-8 fighter collides with American E-P3 surveillance plane off coast of Hainan

2002
October 22
Shanghai Party Secretary Huang Ju and Beijing Party Secretary Jia Qinglin are transferred to the center

November 8–14
Sixteenth Party Congress convenes in Beijing

December 4
Hu Jintao, in his first public appearance as general secretary, speaks at celebration commemorating the 20th anniversary of the 1982 constitution

December 5–6
Hu Jintao visits the revolutionary base of Xibaipo

2003
January 7–9
National meeting of propaganda heads

January 7–8
Rural Work Conference

March 5–11
First Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress Meeting. Wen Jiabao is named premier

April 2
Wen Jiabao presides over a State Council meeting that discusses the SARS issue

April 20
Health Minister Zhang Wenkang and Beijing Mayor Meng Xuenong are dismissed from their posts

May 1
Hu Jintao calls to launch a “people’s war” against SARS

October 11–14
Third Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee

2004
March 2004
An Investigation of China’s Peasants by Chen Guidi and Chu Tao is banned

September 2
Xiao Weibin, editor of the liberal, Guangdong-based Tongzhou gongjin is dismissed for publishing an interview with
### Chronology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 8</td>
<td><em>Southern Personalities Weekly</em> publishes list of the 50 most influential Chinese public intellectuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 13</td>
<td><em>Yitahutu</em> chatroom is closed down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 16–19</td>
<td>Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 19</td>
<td>Jiang Zemin retires from the Central Military Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 22</td>
<td><em>Strategy and Management</em> is closed down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 11</td>
<td>Propaganda Department issues Document Number 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 23</td>
<td>Wang Guangze, a journalist at the 21st <em>Century Business Herald</em>, is fired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 14</td>
<td>Small- and medium-sized SOEs must clarify who is funding a buyout and who will manage the business before any MBO can be approved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 17</td>
<td>Jiao Guobiao is dismissed from Peking University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 14</td>
<td>Management buyouts of large state-owned enterprises are banned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 10</td>
<td>Xinhua News Agency issues draft Property Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 12</td>
<td>Peking University law professor Gong Xiantian posts letter on Internet attacking the draft property rights law</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 5–14</td>
<td>Fourth Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress meeting discusses Eleventh Five-Year Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 10</td>
<td><em>Selected Works</em> of Jiang Zemin are published</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 24</td>
<td>Party Secretary of Shanghai Chen Liangyu is removed from office for his involvement in a security fund scandal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 8–11</td>
<td>Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chronology

December

Sociologist Lu Jianhua is secretly sentenced to twenty years for leaking state secrets

2007

March 5–16

Amended property rights law passed at Fifth Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress meeting

October 15–20

Seventeenth Party Congress convened in Beijing
### Schematic overview of the Chinese political spectrum

#### STATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Left</th>
<th>The Political Center</th>
<th>Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Li Peng</td>
<td>Jiang Zemin</td>
<td>Zhu Rongji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeng Qinghong</td>
<td>Wang Huning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ding Guan’gen</td>
<td></td>
<td>Wang Daohan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tang Wensheng</td>
<td></td>
<td>Liu Ji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Renzhi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The Old Left**
- Deng Liqun
- Yu Quanyu

**Leftist Journals**
- Contemporary Trends
- Quest for Truth
- Mainstream

**Liberals**
- Wan Li
- Li Shenzhi
- Shen Jiru
- Ling Zhijun
- Ma Licheng

#### SOCIETY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The New Left</th>
<th>Liberals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Nationalists</td>
<td>Liu Junning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Can Say No</td>
<td>Qin Hui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Xiaodong</td>
<td>Xu Youyu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Ping</td>
<td>Zhu Xueqin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fang Ning</td>
<td>Lei Yi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post-Modernists</th>
<th>Neostatists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wang Hui</td>
<td>Hu Angang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cui Zhiyuan</td>
<td>Wang Shaoguang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gan Yang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Kuan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** This schematic is arranged horizontally from the center outward, showing those who are far to the left and right of the political center (the Old Left and Liberals respectively) as well as those with left and right tendencies within the political center. Vertically, those farther from the top exercise less political influence. Thus, the Old Left and Liberals influence the political center but are not as powerful, similarly, intellectuals such as Li Shenzhi are not in the same category as former Vice-Premier Wan Li. Other intellectuals, whether New Left or Liberal, are even more distant from the political center and are depicted as societal actors.
Abbreviations and tables

ABBREVIATIONS

ASEANAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations
CACCentral Advisory Commission
CASChinese Academy of Sciences
CASSChinese Academy of Social Sciences
CCPChinese Communist Party
CDICCentral Discipline Inspection Commission
CMCCentral Military Commission
CPSUCommunist Party of the Soviet Union
CYLCommunist Youth League
GATTGeneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
IMFIInternational Monetary Fund
MOFCOMMinistry of Commerce
MOFTECMinistry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
NATONorth Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPCNational People’s Congress
NMDDNational Missile Defense
PBSCPChiburo Standing Committee
PRCPeople’s Republic of China
SETCState Economic and Trade Commission
SEZSpecial Economic Zone
SOESState-Owned Enterprise
SPCState Planning Commission
TVETownship and Village Enterprise
TMDTheater Missile Defense
USTRUnited States Trade Representative
WOTWorld Trade Organization
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3 Leadership of the Chinese Communist Party following the 16th Party Congress 241
4 Frequency of formulations 253
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6 The Secretariat 281
Introduction

In the immediate aftermath of Tiananmen, there were widespread predictions among Chinese and foreign observers alike that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would collapse within a short period. The harsh repression of student-led dissent, not just in Beijing, which was what most of the world watched, but throughout the major cities of China, could not succeed for long, it was thought. The democratic movement was too strong, public disgust with the corruption and authoritarian policies of the government too great, and the world tide against communist governments – exemplified by the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe later that same year – too profound for China to resist for long. When it was announced that Jiang Zemin, the Party secretary of Shanghai, had been made general secretary of the CCP, it was widely assumed that he would be a transitional figure, not unlike Hua Guofeng, who had served briefly as chairman of the Party following Mao Zedong’s death in 1976.¹

It was also widely thought that if, through the exertion of pure brute strength, the communist government was able to reassert itself against the societal forces that had been arrayed against it, that the cost would be economic reform and growth. Indeed, such predictions seemed to be borne out as the pace of reform stalled and as administrative measures against inflation bit deeply into China’s growth rates. By the summer and fall of 1990, China’s growth rates were near zero, by far the slowest rate of growth the Chinese economy had experienced since the start of reform in late 1978.

Such predictions, like so many in the China field, were wrong. The CCP did restore its dominance over society remarkably quickly. The deep differences of opinion within the party were muted if not eliminated by the purge of Party head Zhao Ziyang and other top leaders. Rather than being a transitional figure, Jiang Zemin continued to head the CCP until

¹ Michael Weiskopf, “Chief Rose by Following Prevailing Political Winds.”
stepping down thirteen years later in 2002, and the Chinese economy not only continued to grow but to stir fears that it had become an unstoppable economic juggernaut as China became the manufacturing center of the world. Whereas per capita income at stood at about $250 in 1989, it had grown to some $1200 by 2006, a remarkable achievement for a country of 1.3 billion people and putting China well on the way toward becoming a middle income country.

Even China’s diplomatic pariah status had vanished a decade and a half later as China emerged as an influential presence in world councils, especially in Asia. The change in China’s status was strikingly highlighted by the back-to-back appearances of President Bush, who spoke to the Australian parliament 2003, and Chinese president Hu Jintao, who was greeted much more enthusiastically, when he spoke the following day. The conservative Australian paper the Financial Review summed up the public mood in its headline: “Bush came, Hu conquered.” By 2006, people began talking about China’s emerging “soft power.”

If it is difficult to make predictions about China, we can at least examine periods of history to better understand the reasons they developed as they did, not only to get a better understanding of the state of Chinese politics and society today but also to raise better questions about its development in the future. That is what this book tries to do. There are at least four essential elements in such an inquiry. The first is politics, particularly elite politics. If Tiananmen reflected a political breakdown, how was the political system put back together? What new understandings of politics emerged to transcend the disputes that had fed into Tiananmen? And how did Jiang Zemin, with little experience in elite political circles and none in military, manage to prevail? The second is changing intellectual concerns. Intellectuals were critics of the state in the 1980s, but by the 1990s and beyond many of them were far more accepting of the state and indeed espousing nationalism in one form or another. How does one explain this change? Third, not only did intellectuals change, but so did the relationship between the state and intellectuals. This relationship became much more complex as both the nature of the state and the intellectual community were changing. And fourth, social change, which has affected the way people have thought about their society and has forced the state to modify its agenda. Not only did new social issues force their way onto the agenda, but the interests that had grown up in the 1990s complicated the state’s ability to respond. International relations are not a focus of this book, but,
Introduction

as we will see, China’s relations with other countries, particularly the United States, have affected the way people view China’s domestic issues, just as those domestic issues influence the way people have seen international relations.

ELITE POLITICS

Elite politics have been contentious at best throughout the twentieth century. Neither of Mao Zedong’s first two designated successors, Liu Shaoqi or Lin Biao, was successful in replacing Mao. Only Hua Guofeng, chosen as Mao was nearing death, was able to succeed, but he was too junior in the informal political hierarchy to survive for long. And neither Hu Yaobang nor Zhao Ziyang, the heir apparents to Deng Xiaoping, was able to take his place. Such failures manifested a winner-take-all mode of political contestation in which power is conceived of as “monistic, unitary and indivisible.” Such a tradition, rooted in the imperial past, but reinforced and indeed heightened by the political struggles of the twentieth century, has undermined the creation of political institutions and the emergence of more pluralistic understandings of politics. The structure of Leninist systems also makes political succession difficult. Overcoming such legacies is not easy, though the creation of institutions, both formal and informal, suggests a possible course of transition to more stable politics.

The history of political contestation in twentieth-century China in general and the heritage of Leninism in particular make it difficult for both institution building and pluralist understandings of political power. The historical record to date suggests that Leninist systems do have difficulty reforming politically. Those in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe imploded, while those in Cuba and North Korea have resisted reform; China and Vietnam have reformed economically but political reform has been limited (though recently Vietnam has made important strides). Can China chart a path that might lead to liberalization and perhaps to democratization? Can political reform follow the same, incremental path of “crossing the river while feeling the stones” as the economic reforms?

If the rules of political struggle in the twentieth century have been dominated by the perception that actors were in a game to win all, it is nevertheless true that the inauguration of reform has posed a significant challenge to this perception. Indeed, one of the major thrusts of reform was to curtail

the abuses of authority that had been associated with Mao’s rule, particularly during the Cultural Revolution. It was widely believed among the veteran cadres who returned to power in the late 1970s that “normal” Party life had been badly disrupted and was in urgent need of restoration. The mantra of the day was “collective leadership,” meaning both that decisions should be made after inner Party discussions in which views could be freely expressed and that those who disagreed with the resulting decision should be allowed to retain their views as long as they agreed to implement the decision. The norm of democratic centralism also contained a sense that there were procedures to be followed in convening Party meetings so that one person could not arbitrarily impose his or her will on the Party or its management — including, for example, such issues as recruitment, evaluation, and promotion of cadres. Although such norms have never been fully adhered to, they continued to exert a moral force. It was toward that end that the Party passed in 1980 the Guiding Rules on Inner Party Life and adopted a new Party constitution two years later. In this way, the reaction of the CCP as an organization paralleled that of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union following Stalin’s death in 1953.

Though Deng did not always adhere to the norms of collective leadership — his position as the “core” of the Party connoting something more than simply first among equals — he nevertheless advocated it in principle. Deng voiced the need to create sound political institutions in his famous 1980 speech on reforming the Party and state systems: “If these [leadership] systems are sound, they can place restraints on the actions of bad people; if they are unsound, they can hamper the efforts of good people or indeed, in certain cases, may push them in the wrong direction.” It was in deference to these emerging norms of collective leadership that Deng played down the role of personality cult, though it should be noted that he was not above pushing his ideas in a cultlike fashion at critical junctures.

While these inner Party norms were being developed, Chinese society, economy, and culture became far more complex and more integrated with the world. Not only has the Chinese economy more than quadrupled in size since 1978, state control has also retreated significantly from direct management of the economy. Even as late as 1998, there were 64,737 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), employing 110 million workers. By year-end 2005, the number of SOEs had fallen by two-thirds, to 27,477, and the number of workers employed in SOEs had fallen by 40 percent to

---

4 Joseph Fewsmith, “The Impact of Reform on Elite Politics.”
5 For instance, the 1983 publication of Deng’s Selected Works preceded the adoption of the critical Decision on Economic Structural Reform.
64 million. In the same period, the number of private enterprises had grown from 10,667, employing 9.7 million people, to 123,820, employing over 34.5 million workers.

These economic changes, which have been paralleled by social changes less easy to capture with statistics, have forced the Chinese government increasingly to adopt indirect ways of managing the economy, thus changing in important ways the state–society relationship. They have also fostered the growth of law. Since the revival of the National People's Congress (NPC) in the late 1970s, the process of law-making has become more institutionalized and rationalized — though there is still a long way to go.5

In addition, the 1978 reform decision to turn from class struggle to economic modernization has gone further than anyone could have predicted at the time. With the emphasis on economic growth has come a change in the basis of the regime's legitimacy. Although the Party still claims legitimacy on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and this claim has important consequences for the political system, everyone is aware that performance legitimacy has become far more important than ideology in justifying the government's continued rule. This was true during the 1980s but has become even more important in the years since 1989, in large part because the Tiananmen Square tragedy destroyed what little belief in Marxism-Leninism was left.

The change in the role of Party ideology, the reassertion of Party norms and the emergence and growth of new norms, the increasing complexity of the society and economy, the growing integration of the Chinese economy into the world economy, the growing body of laws and lawyers, and the increasing role played by quasi-representative organs such as the NPC have all been justly heralded as charting a path of gradual political transition. At the same time, however, it should be recognized that these emerging norms and institutions stand in tension with rule by a Leninist party and the traditional game of winner-take-all politics. Whereas the former trends point to a growing pluralization of Chinese society and governance, the latter suggest a continuing institutional and cultural rejection of pluralism.7

Although the Jiang Zemin era saw considerable efforts to reconcile these conflicting aspects of the political system, particularly with Jiang’s enunciation of the “Three Represents,” which permitted entrepreneurs to join the CCP, there has been a surprising re-emphasis on ideology, not to mention a tightened control over media and crackdown on those who pursue rights

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5 Murray Scott Tanner, The Politics of Lawmaking in China; Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage.

7 Thomas A. Metzger, A Cloud Across the Pacific.
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even within the framework of the Chinese legal system, in the first years of the Hu Jintao era.\footnote{Amnesty International, “China: The Olympics Countdown – Failing to Keep Human Rights Promises.”}

In short, one should not assume that changes observed in the social and economic realms will necessarily be reflected in the Chinese political system; certainly there will not be a one-to-one correspondence. Political systems confronted by socioeconomic change can respond in a variety of ways, not all of which are “rational” from the perspective of enhancing the overall performance of the system. Political systems can simply ignore socioeconomic change, leading to stagnation (both economic and political) and collapse. Individual actors in the political system may also seek personal financial benefit from such changes and so drive what economists call “rent seeking” to new heights, hobbling the emergence of more effective administration. However, political systems can also respond positively, generating more efficient public bureaucracies and more democratic political systems.

How political systems respond depends on a variety of factors, including the perceived threat that socioeconomic changes pose to the political system as well as to individual leaders within that system. Individual leaders will command varying resources and thus respond differently to the challenges confronting the system. Some leaders will resist change while others will seek to respond positively, hoping they can ride such changes to continued or greater success within the political system. In the course of responding to such change, individual leaders are responding within the political culture of the regime – in China’s case, within the contours of the CCP and within the context of the winner-take-all rules of the game – even if they are trying to change the system.

There are reasons to believe that over time Chinese politics have become more institutionalized and that conflict among leaders is better contained. But succession in Leninist systems is never easy, and, as we will see, the succession from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao, while it has gone better than most, has not been without its tensions. And it is not clear that Hu will be able to pass power on to a successor in a smooth and institutionalized manner.

\textbf{INTELLECTUAL CONCERNS}

The second area that needs to be investigated is that of the changing intellectual attitudes and concerns in the years following Tiananmen. This is
the story most at odds with Western (particularly American) expectations of China, particularly in the first few years after Tiananmen. The student demonstrations in 1989 raised such expectations that it took a long time for Western politicians, editorial writers, and journalists to understand that China was not on the cusp of democratic transition. China may eventually emerge as a democratic nation, but, if so, its path will be longer and more complicated than was so widely assumed in the early 1990s.\(^9\) Contrary to those Western hopes, a significant number of intellectuals in China came to have different comprehensions of their society and the international order than their Western counterparts assumed they had. The story of intellectual development in the 1980s was one of critical self-examination (how could the Cultural Revolution have occurred?), of a cosmopolitan opening to the world, and of democratic hope and aspiration (though a serious investigation of these attitudes needs to include a critical analysis of underlying assumptions about democracy).\(^10\) By the 1990s, many intellectuals were more supportive of their own government and more critical of the West than at any time since the May Fourth Movement of 1919.

Over the past century Chinese intellectuals have worked to create a more open and liberal society, though they have often submerged that quest into what they believed was a broader and more urgent quest for national sovereignty.\(^11\) Nonetheless, whenever international and domestic tensions have relaxed, intellectuals have resumed their efforts to bring greater rationality to the political process, normalize the state–society relationship, and integrate China more fully into the international order. This was certainly the case following the Cultural Revolution. When Mao’s death in 1976 brought that cataclysm to an end, intellectuals once again resumed their “proper” role in Chinese society.

Nothing expressed more vividly the hopes for a new era than Deng Xiaoping’s humble statement in 1978 that he wished to serve as the “director of support services” for China’s scientists and technicians so that they could devote themselves wholeheartedly to their work and to China’s modernization.\(^12\) But simple expressions of good wishes could hardly change fundamentally the relationship that had grown up between the Party and intellectuals since the Yan’an era. Mao had made it clear in his 1942 speech to the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art that intellectuals must overcome

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\(^9\) In this judgment, I differ from Bruce Gilley, who believes democratic transformation much more imminent. See his *China’s Democratic Future*.

\(^10\) Merle Goldman, *Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China*.

\(^11\) Vera Schwarcz, *The Chinese Enlightenment*.

\(^12\) Deng Xiaoping, “Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the National Conference on Science.”
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their natural petty bourgeois nature by self-consciously “integrating” themselves with the “masses” – with the Party as judge of how successfully they had done so. With the perspective of thirty years of persecution, intellectuals naturally were critics of the Party/state even when they served it. Indeed, some of the most prominent and outspoken of the liberal intelligentsia worked for the state, often in high places, and their self-assigned mission was to change the state from within. Drawing primarily from the liberal tradition in Marxism and sometimes on Western liberalism, they sought to build a state that placed unprecedented emphasis on human beings – and that meant creating a more liberal, democratic order.

Even as high-ranking cadres, then, such liberal intellectuals were critics of the state and constituted what X. L. Ding termed a “counterelite.” As critics, they inevitably turned to the May Fourth tradition for moral inspiration – particularly its emphasis on science, democracy, cosmopolitanism, and the leading role for intellectuals as societal conscience. The May Fourth Movement (1919) was part of a broader New Culture Movement (1915–20), which drew inspiration from the European Enlightenment and hence was dubbed the “Chinese Enlightenment.” Accordingly, liberal intellectuals in the 1980s were often referred to (and saw themselves) as “enlightenment intellectuals”; indeed, one of the liberal journals founded in the late 1980s was known as The New Enlightenment (Xin qimeng).

As the 1980s wore on, China’s intellectual establishment diversified. Anticipating trends that would continue, albeit with significantly different content, in the 1990s, intellectuals with only minimal attachment to the state started to become active. The most important of these groups were gathered around book series and journals: the Toward the Future (Zouxiang weilai congshu) book series, created by Jin Guantao and Bao Zunxin; the Academy of Chinese Culture, organized by Tang Yijie, Li Zhonghua, and Wang Shucang; and the Culture: China and the World (Wenhua: Zhongguo yu shijie congshu) book series, started by Gan Yang and Liu Xiaofeng. These groups fueled the “cultural fever” (wenhua re) of the late 1980s, epitomized by the film River Elegy (He Shang). The self-assigned mission of these groups was to carve out a “public space” that was independent of the state; it was a mission that assumed a common discourse based on Enlightenment ideals.

13 Mao Tse-tung [Mao Zedong], “The Yenan Forum on Literature and Art.”
14 X. L. Ding, The Decline of Communism in China.
15 The best discussion of these trends is Chen Fong-ching and Jin Guantao, From Youthful Manuscripts to River Elegy.