The European Security Strategy (ESS) has become an important reference framework for the EU since its inception in 2003. Without strategy an actor can only really be a ‘reactor’ to events and developments. In the ESS the EU now has a strategy, with which it has the potential of shifting boundaries and shaping the World.

The EU and the European Security Strategy explores this statement and examines the underlying concepts and implementation of the ESS as a judging tool of all the European Union’s external actions. Contributors, closely involved in the early debate leading up to the ESS, assess questions such as how the strategy has shaped EU policy, how it relates to existing policies but also how it has added value to these policies and whether the strategy’s objectives are sufficient to safeguard EU interests or whether they should be reviewed and added too.

The outline of the strategy itself is followed, addressing its historical and conceptual context, the threat assessment, the multilateral and regional policies of the EU, its military capabilities and its strategic partnerships. This book offers a comprehensive vision of how the EU can achieve the ambitious objectives of the European Security Strategy and become an effective global actor as the strategy helps to forge a global Europe.

This book will be of great interest to students and researchers of European politics and security studies.

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'Mon père, ce héros au sourire si doux' (Victor Hugo, *Après la Bataille*)

To my father François Biscop (1944–2006)

Sven Biscop

To my daughter Stella Buus Andersson (born 2006)

Jan Joel Andersson
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This volume grew out of our mutual fascination with the European Security Strategy (ESS) and its potential role in forging a Global Europe. The first draft of the ESS was presented by Javier Solana at the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003. This draft was then discussed in an unusual European-wide consultation process at three seminars organised by the EU in the fall of 2003 in Rome (19 September), Paris (6–7 October) and Stockholm (20 October). Both of us had the privilege to participate in this process. Jan Joel Andersson of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) participated in all three events and was responsible for organising the Stockholm seminar and authored the seminar’s discussion paper on Coherence and Capabilities (Andersson 2003a). Sven Biscop of Belgium’s Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations took part in two of the seminars and co-authored a proposal for a security concept, which was presented to Solana at a conference on 26 November (Coolsaet and Biscop 2003). By the end of the consultation process and once the ESS had been adopted by the European Council in December 2003, we agreed that we should edit a volume on this remarkable document. To this end, we assembled a great team of colleagues of whom several also had participated in the consultation process on the draft ESS.

It has been a pleasure to serve as the editors of this volume. We appreciate the patience and endurance of our authors, who wrote their chapters with good humour – if not always with great speed. We have learned greatly from their efforts and have enjoyed ourselves in the process. We would also like to thank Harriet Brinton at Routledge, for her immense patience with us and for repeatedly extending our deadlines, as well as her colleague Amelia McLaurin, for the smooth transition after she took over our project from Harriet.
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Abbreviations

AC   Arctic Council
ACO  Allied Command Operations
ACP  African, Caribbean and Pacific states
ACT  Allied Command Transformation
AEC  ASEAN Security Community/ASEAN Economic Community
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APRM African Peer Review Mechanism
ARF  ASEAN Regional Forum
ASCC ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM Asia-Europe Meeting
AVF  All-Volunteer Force
BEAC Barents Euro Arctic Council
BG   Battlegroup
CBS  Council of the Baltic Sea States
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States
CJTF Combined Joint Task Force
CRBN Chemical, Radiological, Biological, Nuclear
CS   Combat Support
CSAP Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSS  Combat Service Support
DDR  Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo
ECAP European Capability Action Plan
ECE  East Central Europe
EDA  European Defence Agency
EDC  European Defence Community
<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>EMP</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENEC</td>
<td>European Network Enabling Capability</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td>ENPI</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<td>ESDC</td>
<td>European Security and Defence College</td>
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<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Identity</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU3</td>
<td>The governments of Britain, France and Germany</td>
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<td>EUISS</td>
<td>European Union Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMM</td>
<td>European Monitoring Mission</td>
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<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
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<td>GIA</td>
<td>Groupe Islamique Armé</td>
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<td>GPG</td>
<td>Global Public Goods</td>
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<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global Positioning System</td>
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<td>HEU</td>
<td>High-Enriched Uranium</td>
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<td>HGTF</td>
<td>Headline Goal Task Force</td>
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<td>HHG</td>
<td>Helsinki Headline Goal</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ISTAR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance</td>
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<td>MD</td>
<td>Mediterranean Dialogue</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>NIS</td>
<td>Newly Independent States</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy (of the US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBC</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCA</td>
<td>Partnership and Cooperation Agreement</td>
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<td>PGMs</td>
<td>Precision-Guided Munitions</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
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<td>SIIA</td>
<td>Swedish Institute of International Affairs</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACIS</td>
<td>Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV/STA</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle/Surveillance, and Target Acquisition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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Introduction

Sven Biscop and Jan Joel Andersson

When the EU ministers of foreign affairs, meeting informally at Kastellorizo on the island of Rhodes on 2–3 May 2003 tasked Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with the drafting of a strategic concept, this came as a complete surprise to most observers, or at least to the editors of this volume. Until then the adoption of anything like a strategy for the CFSP had been thought politically unfeasible in a European Union divided between ‘Atlanticists’ and ‘Europeanists’. Academic publications calling for the adoption of a strategy had been laid aside as certainly interesting, perhaps even welcome, but in any case unrealistic proposals (Van Staden et al. 2000; Biscop 2002). But about a month later already, at the Thessalonica European Council on 19–20 June, Solana presented his first draft, which was subsequently discussed by those same observers, along with diplomats, the military, NGO representatives etc., at three seminars organised by the European Union for that purpose in the fall of 2003: Rome (19 September), Paris (6–7 October) and Stockholm (20 October). On 12 December 2003 the European Council meeting in Brussels adopted the final document, A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy (ESS) (European Council 2003a).

Perhaps the editors were not the only ones to be surprised at the suddenness and the magnitude of this move: the adoption of a strategic document covering in effect the whole of EU foreign policy, across the pillars, from aid and trade to diplomacy and the military. Rumour had it that not all participants in the Kastellorizo meeting were equally aware of the scope of the decision they had taken. By concentrating the drafting of the ESS in the hands of his own team and then seeking feedback from a broad audience, at the three seminars, Solana prevented Member States with second thoughts from blocking the process, although this implied that to some extent normal decision-making procedures were by-passed, to the detriment notably of the Political and Security Committee (PSC). Yet reluctant Member States could
still hope, as a number of observers did expect as well, that soon after its adoption the ESS would disappear into some dusty drawer – the key of which some would probably have liked to present to NATO for safekeeping. There was indeed a risk that the adoption of the ESS, which was accompanied by the necessary pomp and circumstance, would be nothing more than a one-off demonstration of regained unity after the intra-European divide over Iraq, a step of high symbolic value but with little impact on actual policy-making. A stratagem rather than a strategy . . .

The ESS has certainly not disappeared, however. Quite the contrary, it is omnipresent in EU discourse. In many policy documents and decisions on different aspects of foreign policy, especially those relating to the CFSP and its military dimension, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the guidelines fixed by the ESS are constantly being referred to. They also serve as the connecting thread throughout the trainings organised by the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) for practitioners from the Member States. In the decision-making process, Member States as well as the European institutions make good tactical use of the ESS: the more convincingly a proposed initiative can be linked to it, the more difficult it is to oppose. This demonstrates that the ESS is more than ‘a recipe for masterly inactivity’ (Toje 2005: 132). Moreover, the ESS frequently appears on reading lists at colleges and universities around the world and is one of the most spread and read EU documents among the general public.

On this initial evidence, the most pessimistic alternative view of the ESS as a mere ‘piece of paper’ can already be set aside. A suitable political and procedural transmission belt appears to have been found to translate specific desiderata from the ESS into more immediate operational requirements, and to make sure that the latter are followed up and reported on in good time.

(Bailes 2005a: 22)

There are of course authors who insist that the ESS is not a strategy at all (Heisbourg 2004; Toje 2005). Too much influenced perhaps by the traditional strategic studies in the realist school, they associate strategy in the first place with the use of force. That is just one dimension of many which a foreign policy strategy has to cover, however. For that is what the ESS does: it covers not just security policy, as the title of the document indeed misleadingly – and perhaps mistakenly – suggests, but foreign policy as a whole. That does not mean that the European Union would not benefit from the adoption of a military doctrine or operational concept, outlining the conditions for and ways of utilising the military instrument (Bailes 2005a: 20).
Such a document could provide the link between the ESS and ESDP. What this book aims to do is to assess whether the ESS effectively functions as a strategy in the much broader sense of the term as it is understood in the context of public management, a definition which is not linked specifically to defence, security or even foreign policy, but can be applied to any policy field. A strategy is a policy-making tool which, on the basis of the values and interests of in this case the European Union, outlines the long-term overall policy objectives to be achieved and the basic categories of instruments to be applied to that end. It serves as a reference framework for day-to-day policy-making in a rapidly evolving and increasingly complex international environment and it guides the definition of the means – i.e. the civilian and military capabilities – that need to be developed (Biscop 2005: 1). A strategy thus obviously is not meant to be an operational document, another reason used to dismiss the strategic claims of the ESS (Maull 2005: 792–94), but has to be translated into sub-strategies for specific policy fields and then into concrete policies and actions. In a way, a strategy has an inspirational function vis-à-vis policy-making (Bailes 2005a: 14).

Given the omnipresence of the ESS, it can be argued that in this sense a strategic culture is developing at the EU level, i.e. the habit of automatically referring to the strategic framework of the ESS when taking decisions and the willingness to undertake the actions and commit the means required to achieve those strategic objectives. Just like strategy is a much broader concept than often thought, strategic culture as well must thus be judged by much more than the willingness to use force when necessary, even though admittedly this aspect of strategic culture is the most difficult to realise. European Union strategic culture may not be uniform or common enough, but it seems to be gradually becoming so (Baun 2005).

This emerging strategic culture is what this book aims to investigate. To what extent do the choices made in the ESS effectively function as a reference framework for day-to-day decision-making and shape EU policy? How do these choices relate to existing policies and what added value has the adoption of the strategic framework brought? Are the assumptions of the ESS still valid, are its objectives sufficient to safeguard EU interests and can they be achieved? Which additional actions, instruments and means could help achieving these objectives? Are there areas still to be covered by fundamental strategic reflection? Should the ESS be reviewed?

In order to address these questions, the book follows the outline of the ESS itself. In Chapter 1 Sven Biscop puts the ESS in its historical and conceptual context, focusing on the trend of comprehensive or holistic approaches to deal with the challenges of an ever more complex global environment. Jean-Yves Haine in Chapter 2 then analyses the EU assessment of that envi-
Sven Bicop and Jan Joel Andersson

The ensuing chapters address the different strategic objectives which the European Union has arrived at on the basis of that worldview: ‘effective multilateralism’ at the global level (Chapter 3 by Richard Gowan); securing the EU’s neighbourhood (Chapter 4 by Roland Dannreuther); building an effective military capacity (Chapter 5 by Jolyon Howorth); establishing strategic partnerships (Chapter 6 by Roberto Menotti and Maria Francesca Vencato); and increasing the coherence of EU foreign policy (Chapter 7 by Jan Joel Andersson). As the emergence of the European Union as a strategic actor automatically impacts on the transatlantic relationship, finally Chapter 8 will offer an American view of the ESS by Catherine Kelleher.

Without strategy any actor can really only be a ‘reactor’ to events and developments. Equipped with a clear strategy and endowed with a strong strategic culture, an actor can shape the world. Whether the ESS has succeeded in forging such a global Europe is the topic of this volume.

Note

1 The programmes, discussion papers and reports from the three working seminars on the draft European Security Strategy in Rome, Paris and Stockholm are available on the webpage of the EU Institute for Security Studies (www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.html).
1 The European Security Strategy in context

A comprehensive trend

Sven Biscop

If the task given to Javier Solana by the May 2003 informal Council meeting to draft a European strategic concept came as a surprise, it was because it happened at a time when the CFSP seemed to be in shambles as a result of the fierce intra-European debate over the American-led invasion of Iraq. Only a few months before, on 10 February, Belgium, France and Germany had provoked what seemed to be the worst crisis yet for both the CFSP and the transatlantic Alliance when they broke the ‘silent procedure’ introduced by NATO Secretary-General George Robertson to approve a number of US requests in the framework of the planned invasion. Although on 19 February consensus was reached on defensive measures to assist Turkey in the event of any Iraqi incursion, other proposed measures, including advance planning for a post-invasion NATO peacekeeping mission in Iraq, were silently removed from the agenda (Pailhe 2003). Seen to be too evidently framed in a war logic at a moment when they felt non-military options were still available, Belgium, France and Germany could not consent to such measures without betraying the principles of their own foreign policy. Fierce recriminations across the Atlantic as well as between EU member states were the result.

Yet a few months later these same member states agreed to have the first ever common European foreign policy strategy drafted, which on 12 December 2003 they duly adopted. How was it that at exactly the moment of what seemed to be the lowest point of the CFSP the European Union achieved what right up until then had been considered politically unfeasible?

Codification of a strategic orientation

It was of course evident from the beginning that the CFSP – as is not entirely uncommon in policy-making – did not follow the scientifically prescribed
logic of first adopting a strategy and then designing specific policies and acquiring the required capabilities to implement it. The notion of strategy was not, however, completely absent either. The Amsterdam Treaty added the ‘common strategies’ to the range of CFSP instruments; these are strategies – now effectively sub-strategies vis-à-vis the ESS – on specific functional or geographical issues. Only three have ever been adopted by the European Council: on Russia, Ukraine (both 1999) and the Mediterranean (2000). Subsequently more documents of a similar scope have been adopted by the Council and European Council though, only in other legal formats, even if some carry the word ‘strategy’ in the title – which also holds true for the ESS itself. Examples are the European Strategy Against the Proliferation of WMD (2003b), the Council decision to launch the European Neighbourhood Policy (2004), and the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2005c). None of these amounts to a strategy for foreign policy as a whole. So if prior to 2003 the member states were familiar with the idea of strategies – plural – they probably also became aware of ‘possible deficits in coherence and completeness among the strategies so far adopted on a piece-meal basis (and perhaps of a quality problem as well)” (Bailes 2005a: 8).

This strategic void became particularly evident after 1999, when the European Union started to build a military dimension, ESDP. Although the Petersberg-Tasks as included in the Amsterdam Treaty describe which types of operations the European Union can undertake – really anything but collective defence – without a foreign policy strategy it was far from clear in support of which political objectives forces were to be deployed under the EU flag. Member states were very much divided over the desired degree of autonomy of ESDP vis-à-vis NATO and the United States. In view of the perceived unfeasibility of achieving anything like a strategic consensus at the time, it was decided to push on with those elements on which agreement existed, i.e. the development of command and control structures and the making available of military capabilities to the European Union, assuming that the strategic debate would inevitably resurface at another, hopefully more suitable time. Again this is a tactic which is not uncommon in EU policy-making, nor is it necessarily an unwise one, for otherwise the window of opportunity to launch ESDP might have been missed. In 2001 the Belgian Presidency did propose to task the Paris-based EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) with the drafting of a strategic concept, but in the face of strong opposition from a number of member states the mandate was watered down to the elaboration of a number of scenarios with which the European Union might be confronted and an assessment of the required capabilities to deal with such situations. Eventually published in 2004 (EUISS 2004), this is a stimulating contribution to the debate on ESDP but nothing like a strategic concept.
It seems as if the intra-European crisis over Iraq finally provided the stimulus that made a breakthrough possible. On the one hand, the member states supporting the invasion would have been motivated to demonstrate that the European Union does care about the security threats perceived by the United States and that the transatlantic Alliance is viable still. Hence the similarity between the threat assessment in the ESS and the 2002 US National Security Strategy (NSS), which must be seen as a political message to Washington, and the strong emphasis in the ESS on transatlantic partnership. On the other hand, the member states opposing the invasion would have been equally eager to show that even though the threat assessment is to a large degree shared with the United States – be it perhaps not the perception of the intensity of the threat (see Chapter 2) – there are other options available to deal with these threats. In that light the heavy criticism of the NSS by many European observers, because of its emphasis on unilateralism and the pre-emptive use of force, is significant. The context of mid-2003 partially also favoured the adoption of the ESS (Bailes 2005a: 9–10): the successful conclusion of the European Convention and the grand and – then still – promising undertaking to draw up a Constitutional Treaty created a climate in which the elaboration of a strategy seemed more feasible than before. Prominent members of the Convention, such as Wim van Eeckelen, former WEU Secretary-General, had explicitly called for the formulation of a strategic concept. The summer of 2003 also witnessed the first EU military operation without the use of NATO assets and outside of Europe: Operation Artemis in the DRC (12 June – 1 September).

The main reason why these partly contradictory motivations led to results is that the European Union was able to build on an extensive foreign policy acquis. Many of the strategic choices contained in the ESS were already evident as emerging strategic orientations in actual EU policies. Rather than adopting a fundamentally new orientation, to a large extent therefore the ESS must be seen as the codification of existing foreign policy guidelines. In other words, although the context of the Iraq crisis would suggest a deep division between member states, the ESS actually builds on a strong consensus on the basic orientations of EU foreign policy. Indeed, the real intra-European divide over Iraq did not concern the substance and principles of policy. Based on an assessment of past policies, it can safely be argued, e.g. that all member states agree that in principle the use of force is an instrument of last resort which requires a Security Council mandate. As in 1999, the real issue at stake was still the nature of the transatlantic partnership. If the United States reverts to the use of force in a situation in which the European Union in principle would not do so, or not yet, what then has priority for the European Union: steering an autonomous course, based on its own principles, or supporting its most important ally? Besides, it should
not be forgotten that on a number of foreign policy issues the European Union had already unanimously taken positions contrary to those of the United States, e.g. on the ICC, on the Kyoto Protocol and on various trade issues.

If the motivation to effectively pursue this codification and draft the document was context-specific, the ESS itself thus is not. Because it builds on the past, on existing guidelines established during ten years of CFSP, and even before, the ESS has been able to transcend the context of its adoption. It thus has the potential to have a durable impact on the future of EU foreign policy-making, as is testified to by its omnipresence in EU foreign policy documents. A comparison can be made with the codification of European Political Cooperation (EPC), the predecessor of the CFSP, in the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986. The SEA did not really strengthen the informal mechanisms of EPC, but by giving them a legal basis did prevent them from weakening. Codification creates a framework from which it is afterwards more difficult to depart; it circumscribes the room for manoeuvre of future policy-making. In the same sense the ESS has consolidated the strategic orientations that were already emerging. To the extent that the ESS will now effectively function as a reference framework for daily decision-making in all fields of foreign policy, it will promote consistency and the emergence of a strong strategic culture. The fact that the ESS, as a European Council declaration instead of a ‘common strategy’ as defined in the Amsterdam Treaty, is politically rather than legally binding is of less importance in this context.

Naturally, the ESS is not perfect. It can only build on consensus in areas where that existed. On a number of issues it remains particularly vague because consensus was absent or not yet strong enough. Many issues are mentioned in the ESS, because not to do so would have invoked strong criticism, but no more than that: no real choices are made on notably the nature of the transatlantic partnership and the degree of autonomy of the European Union as an international actor. This divide remains a fundamental obstacle to a fully cohesive and resolute CFSP (Dassù and Menotti 2005: 107). Nevertheless, the ESS does contain a number of clear choices and thus certainly has the potential to serve as a strategic framework for EU foreign policy.

**Building on a comprehensive acquis**

The main characteristic of the foreign policy acquis on which the ESS builds is its comprehensive or holistic nature, i.e. the integration of all dimensions of foreign policy, from aid and trade to diplomacy and the military.
The holistic approach has been particularly characteristic of EU policy with regard to its neighbouring states, which it attempts to integrate in an encompassing network of relations, witness the Stability Pact for the Balkans, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), and the successful transition of Central and Eastern Europe, probably the most significant European achievement since the start of the European integration project itself. Under the heading of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) an enhanced framework for relations between the European Union and all of its neighbours has now been created, in the same period in which the ESS was drafted. In the bilateral ENP Action Plans with each individual neighbour an attempt is made to link all dimensions of relations through the mechanism of ‘positive conditionality’ (see Chapter 4). At the global level, the 2000 Cotonou Agreement with the ACP countries, replacing the 1975 Lomé Convention, has similarly become wider in scope, including notably an enhanced political dimension. The holistic approach was also evident in the adoption of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts by the Göteborg European Council (15–16 June 2001), which called for the streamlining of short-term prevention and long-term stabilisation in EU policies across the pillars. The picture that emerges is what Keukeleire (2003) has dubbed the ‘structural foreign policy’ of the European Union and has been so well described by Bretherton and Vogler (2005): a European Union that is – perhaps not always too visibly – seeking to influence the international environment in the long term, attempting to use all the instruments at its disposal, across the pillars, in an integrated way.

This comprehensive approach can be conceptualised through the notion of global public goods (GPG), which emerged in the context of the UN at the end of the 1990s (Biscop 2005). GPG have traditionally been seen in the context of development, but currently the concept is being used more and more in more general political terms, e.g. by Joseph Nye (2002). The starting point of this approach is the assumption that there are a number of ‘goods’ that are global or universal in the sense that it is generally felt – at least in Europe – that every individual is entitled to them. If to a certain extent the definition of the core GPG is a political and normative choice – Rotberg (2004) uses the term ‘political goods’ – many elements have been recognised as being universal beyond any doubt, notably in the field of human rights. Like in the ‘human security’ approach, the individual is the point of reference. These goods are public in the sense that their provision cannot be left to the market but should be supervised by government at the different levels of authority (local, national, regional and global). These core GPG can be grouped under four broad headings: